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County of Washington v. Gunther' presented the United States
Supreme Court with the opportunity to permanently dispose of a the-
ory that would extend or supplant the established doctrine of "equal
pay for equal work"--equal pay for comparable worth.' But rather
than end the long-standing controversy over comparable worth,3 the
five to four majority appeared to take an incremental step towards ac-
ceptance of the revolutionary idea by holding that women can sue their
employer under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act4 without demon-
strating that they performed work equal to that of men.' This step was
not overt, however, as the Court specifically stated that it was not ad-
dressing the theory of comparable worth.6 Moreover, Justice Rehn-
quist sought to emphasize the limits of Gunther by indicating in his
dissent that the majority "does not endorse the so-called 'comparable
worth' theory."' 7 But while the Court clearly avoided endorsement, it
just as clearly failed to permanently dispose of the theory. The decision
in Gunther will have a minimal effect because, while it increases the
range of circumstances under which title VII suits may be brought, an
1. 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981) (probable publication in volume 452 of United States Reports).
2. See generally Comment, The Comparable Worth Theory: A CriticalAnalysis, 32 BAYLOR
L. REv. 629 (1980); Comment, Equal Payfor Comparable Work Value: The Failure of Y'tle VII
and the Equal Pay Act, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 914 (1980).
3. For an exhaustive treatment of the legal, social, and economic ramifications of compara-
ble worth, compare Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, .ob Segregation, and Title VII of The Civil
Rights.Aet of1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wage Discrimination],
wh Nelson, Opton, & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory In Per-
spective, 13 U. MiCH. J.L. REF. 231 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comparable Worth]. Comparable
Worth is a direct response to, and criticism of, Wage Discrimination.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
5. 101 S. Ct. at 2254.
6. Id. at 2246. The Court stated:
We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of the question before us in this case. Re-
spondents' claim is not based on the controversial concept of 'comparable worth,' under
which plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the basis of a comparison of the
intrinsic worth or difficulty of their job with that of other jobs in the same organization
or community.
Id. (citations omitted).
7. Id. at 2265 (Relhquist, L., dissenting).
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overriding problem of proof will remain to preclude any increase in the
number of title VII recoveries. Therefore, Gunther's significance lies
not so much in its holding as in what it refused to hold. The gains to
underpaid women achieved by Gunther are illusory, and the trouble-
some theory of comparable worth remains unresolved.
The concept of "equal pay for comparable work" is espoused by
those seeking a greater degree of consistency between the value to an
employer of a particular employee and that employee's rate of compen-
sation. The premise is that where two employees are performing jobs
that are of comparable value, they should receive equal pay.9 Those
favoring comparable worth claim that employers avoid paying women
the same rate as men by merely assigning women different job titles. 10
But beyond that it is argued that completely dissimilar jobs should be
compared as to their respective worth, and pay scales should be based
on this comparison.1
A conclusion of the wisdom of a comparable worth theory of wage
determination, whether founded on economic or social principles, is
beyond the scope of this note.12 Rather, this note will examine the rele-
vant legislation and case law to demonstrate that the present statutes1 3
8. See generaly Wage Discrimination, supra note 3; Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act.
Expanding Wage DiffierentialProtections Under tie VII, 8 Loy. CHi. L.3. 723 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Beyond EpA].
9. Miller, Preface to NAVL RESEARCH CouNcIL, COMM. ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICA-
TION & ANALYsis, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES at lx (1981):
[A]dvocates of "comparable worth" have called for intervention to redress the inequity
they perceive to be embedded in the present situation. In essence, the point made is that,
within a given organization, jobs that are equal in their value to the organization ought
to be equally compensated, whether or not the work content ofthosejobs is similar. Theimpetus for the formulation of the "comparable worth" concept has come primarily from
the substantial differences in the types of jobs held by men and by women and from the
belief that those traditionally held by women receive lower compensation because theyare held by women.
Id.
10. Wage Discrimination, supra note 3, at 407. b1. See Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 5. Ct. 244 (1980). The plaintiff nurses in Lemons made a straightforward attempt to
recover on the basis of the comparable worth theory. They demanded that their worth be com-
pared with all employees of the City and County of Denver, arguing that to limit the comparison
to other nurses is to perpetuate historically incorporated discrimination. This argument was sum-
marily rejected by the 10th Circuit.
12. See generally Wage Discrimination, supra note 3; Comparable Worth, supra note 3; Be-
yond EPA, supra note 8. Wage Discrimination and Beyond EPA bth advocate expanded use of
title VII, the former using extensive extra-legal forms of analysis. Comparable Worth argues for a
continued limit on title Vies application For a technical report that attempts to classify and
analyze all aspects of comparable worth, see WOMEN, WORc, ANid WAOES, supra note 9.
13. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976); Equal Pay Act (EPA),
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
[Vol. 17:327
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cannot support a claim based on comparable worth and that the
Supreme Court in Gunther would have better served all interested par-
ties by so finding.
Ii. DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL PAY PROVISIONS-BACKGROUND
The women employees in Gunther (hired as county jail "matrons")
instigated their suit under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,14
charging sex-based wage discrimination. They complained that male
co-employees enjoyed higher salaries simply because they were men. 5
Title VII states that it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's...
sex.' 6 Read alone, this provision appears to provide a remedy for the
matrons without requiring a showing of equal work. However, section
703(h) of title VII'7 provides criteria under which an employer is ex-
empt from the prohibition of what would otherwise be unlawful dis-
crimination.' 8 In addition to the listed exemptions the section's final
sentence, known as the "Bennett Amendment,"' 19 ties title VII into the
Equal Pay Act (EPA):2'
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under
this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the ba-
sis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compen-
sation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer #'
such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the
EPA].21
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
15. 101 S. CL at 2245.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976).
17. Id. § 2000e-2(h).
18. Id. The section states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bonafide seniority
or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality ofproduction
or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such diffeerences [sic] are
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give
and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The EPA is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
201-219 (1976).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added).
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This sentence defines the relationship between title VII and the EPA
and is the focal point of the Gunther controversy. The problem, then,
becomes determining what exemptions were created by "differentiation
...authorized by the provisions of [the EPA]."22
The EPA has a somewhat narrower scope than title VII in that it
deals exclusively with sex-based wage discrimination, whereas title VII
deals with racial and religious discrimination, hiring practices, and
working conditions. The EPA provides in part:
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between em-
ployees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees...
at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employ-
ees of the opposite sex. . . for equal work on jobs the per-
formance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar work-
ing conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of produc-
tion; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex .... 23
Given these provisions of the EPA, title VII's language, "author-
ized by the provisions of [the EPA]," can have two reasonable interpre-
tations. The prevailing view until Gunther was that the EPA prohibited
certain forms of wage differentiation and, by implication, "authorized"
all other forms.24 The Bennett Amendment, therefore, provided that a
particular practice of wage differentiation would not be unlawful under
title VII unless it is also unlawful under the EPA. The dissenters in
Gunther adopted this position.23
22. See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMmER, IL RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 10.17-10.18 (1980); 1979-1980Annual Suryvy of Labor Relations
and Employment .Dscrimnation Law-Tile VII and the Equal Pay Act, 22 B.C.L. REV. 40, 184
(1980); Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III- 77tle II of the 1964 Civil
Afghts Act and the Equal PayAct of.1963, 20 HAST. L.. 305, 344-46 (1968).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
24. See notes 70-79 ifra and accompanying text.
25. 101 S. Ct. at 2261 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). One commentator criticizes this interpreta-
tion as an unconventional use of the word "authorize":
[That the term "authorized" refers to all differentials not prohibited by the EPA
... involves an assumption that the power of the employer to set wages derives from
Congress. Only then could a wage rate which is not prohibited by the Act be said to be
authorized by Congress. But the basic premise of our constitutional system is to the
contrary. Governmental authorization is not necessary in order to engage in the ordi-
nary economic and social activities of life. The concept of our government as one of
limitedpowers presupposes a freedom of action in the absence of governmental regula-
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The second interpretation, which was acknowledged 26 but never
adopted until Gunther, is that the Bennett Amendment merely incorpo-
rates the EPA's four affirmative defenses into title VII. In other words,
a particular practice of wage differentiation would not be unlawful
under title VII if it is "pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex.
' 27
While both of these interpretations are reasonable, neither of them
is without significant weakness. An analysis of the EPA and title VII
will demonstrate that the first interpretation is the better of the two.
A. Equal Pay Act
The notion of mandating equal pay for work of equal or compara-
ble value received significant congressional scrutiny between World
War II and 1963.28 Numerous bills were introduced during this period
attempting to achieve this goal,29 nearly all of which opted for the lan-
guage "equal pay for comparable work."30 These bills were consist-
ently rejected, however, and it was not until 1963 that an equal pay bill
eventually passed.3'
House Resolution 10226 was one of the last equal pay bills intro-
duced that retained the "comparable work" language.32 But after de-
Wage Discrimination, supra note 3, at 482. To the extent that this criticism is valid, the interpreta-
tion can be defended by looking beyond the language, to the intent of the Bennett Amendment.
See notes 61-70 infra and accompanying text.
26. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civii P'ghtsAct of 1964, 31 BRooKLYN L.
Rnv. 62, 75-76 (1964).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). The basic criticism levied against this interpretation is that
title VII already includes these affirmative defenses, and it is unreasonable to assume Bennett
added the provision as mere reinforcement thereof. See notes 62-63 infra and accompanying text.
28. See generally Comparable Worth, supra note 3; BeyondEPA, supra note 8, at 734-42. Gitt
and Gelb found that since World War H, an attempt was made during every congressional session
to pass some type of equal pay act. These commentators trace this activity to a similar equal pay
requirement set forth by the War Labor Board. Id. at 734-37.
29. See, ag., S. 1178, 79th Cong., 1st Ses., 91 CONG. Rac. 6411 (1945) (Women's Equal Pay
Act of 1945); S. 706, 81st Cong., Ist Seas., 95 CONG. REc. 550 (1949) (Women's Equal Pay Act of
1949); H.R. 3550, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 CONG. Rac. 3398 (1951) (Women's Equal Pay Act of
1949); S. 176, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REc. 155 (1953) (Women's Equal Pay Act of 1953);
H.R. 59, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., 101 CONG. Rac. 32 (1955) (Women's Equal Pay Act of 1955); S.
39262, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REc. 18961 (1960) (Women's Equal Pay for Equal Work
Act of 1960); H.R. 11677, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 CONG. REc. 8047 (1962) (Equal Pay Act).
30. E.g., H.R. 4273, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. RBC. 3929 (1947) (emphasis added).
31. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1976)).
32. H.R. 10226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 CONG. REc. 2263 (1962).
19811
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bate in the House of Representatives, 33 the bill was amended and
became one of the first to use the more restrictive "equal work" lan-
guage. This change was made because of the more precise and limited
definition of "equal." The amendment's sponsor, Representative St.
George stated: "[Tihere is a great difference between the word 'compa-
rable' and the word 'equal'. . . . 'Equal' implies no difference in
amount, number, value. This is not true of the word 'comparable.' The
word 'comparable' opens up great vistas. It gives tremendous latitude
to whoever is to be arbitrator in these disputes." 34 Agreeing with St.
George, Representative Landrum stated, "If, in fact, we want to estab-
lish equal pay for equal work, then we ought to say so and [thereby
prevent] employees of the Labor Department [from] harassing business
with their various interpretations of the term 'comparable'. . ... 35
These remarks indicate that the EPA was not intended to provide a
remedy for a broad range of sex-based wage differentials, but rather to
ensure "where men and women are doing the same job under the same
working conditions that they will receive the same pay."'36 Included in
the limited objectives of the EPA was that it "not be excessive nor ex-
cessively wide ranging." 37 Use of "equal" would help to achieve this
goal of limitation, whereas "comparable" might allow Labor Depart-
ment officials to exceed their authority.
The opponents of Landrum and St. George in the debate between
"equal" and "comparable" did not disagree with the statements that
"equal" has a more precise meaning and would therefore limit the ef-
fect of the EPA. Indeed, such a limitation was precisely the effect to
which they objected. 38 Representatives Green and Zelenko felt that
substituting "equal" for "comparable" would render the bill ineffectual
because it would require exact uniformity; a criterion that could easily
be overcome by an unscrupulous employer.39 Use of the word "compa-
rable," Zelenko argued, would permit "a realistic and practical ap-
33. 108 CONG. REC. 14767-14771 (1962).
34. Id. at 14767.
35. Id. at 14768.
36. 109 CONG. REc. 9196 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen).
37. Id. '
38. 108 CONG. REc. 14768-69 (1962).
39. Id. at 14768. "If a showing of equality was a requisite to establish the requirement of
equal pay, the conscious introduction of one slight and trivial factor might be considered sufficient
to justify a lower wage rate." Id. Rep. Olsen expressed his concern that use of "equal" would
nullify the bill's effectiveness:
My impression of the amendment [to substitute "equal" for "comparable"] is that
[it] would require an impossible proof, an impossible amount of proof, to require that the
work and the skill be exactly equal. I think this would be an absolute impossibility. To
[Vol. 17:327
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praisal of two jobs to determine whether they have enough like
characteristics and skill demands to warrant the same basic pay rate."4
Thus, the debate was focused on the desired degree of restriction
that the Equal Pay Act should have. Using "equal" would allow less
intrusion into wage determination practices of businesses but would in-
clude the risk of enacting an ineffectual bill. On the other hand, opting
for "comparable" would allow greater interpretive latitude but might
extend the effect of the legislation beyond the stated desire-equal pay
for equal work.'"
In the end the bill was defeated, but only after the amendment to
substitute "equal" for "comparable" had been agreed upon.42 When
the bill was re-introduced in 1963, it contained the word "equal" from
the beginning, and there was no debate on the equal/comparable is-
sue.43 It had already been decided that the inherent limitations of the
word "equal" were to be preferred to the less precise "comparable." 44
In order to emphasize the significance of the equal work standard,
Representative Goodell stated shortly before passage of the bill:
[lit is important that we have clear legislative history at this
point. Last year when the House changed the word "compa-
rable" to "equar' the clear intention was to narrow the whole
concept. We went from "comparable" to "equar' meaning
that the jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is,
they would be very much alike or closely related to each
other.
We do not expect the Labor Department people to go
into an establishment and attempt to rate jobs that are not
equal. We do not want to hear the Department say, "Well,
they amount to the same thing," and evaluate them so they
have such an amendment in this legislation would be like having no bill at all. I think it
would be much better to have the word "comparable" in the legislation.
Id. at 14770.
40. Id. at 14768. These fears of the word "equal" were to be allayed by three district court
holdings. See Shultz v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 305 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Tex. 1969); Wirtz v.
Rainbo Baking Co. of Lexington, 303 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Ky. 1967); Wirtz v. Basic, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 786 (D. Nev. 1966). The Third Circuit followed suit in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421
F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970): "Congress in prescribing "equal" work did not require that the jobs be
identical, but only that they must be substantially equal. Any other interpretation would destroy
the remedial purposes of the Act." Id. at 265 (footnote omitted).
41. H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD.
NEws 687, 688 (stated intent: "employees doing equal work should be paid equal wages, regard-
less of sex").
42. 108 CONG. REc. 14771 (1962).
43. See 109 CONG. Rlc. 9197 (1963).
44. Id. The EPA was passed June 10, 1963. See note 31 su.pra.
1981]
7
Fiske: County of Washington v. Gunther: Movement towards Comparable Wort
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
TULSA LAW JOUiAAL
come up to the same skill or point. We expect this to apply
only to jobs that are substantially identical or equal.45
While one representative's statements cannot, as a rule, be taken as in-
dicative of the whole legislative history, Representative Goodell's re-
marks appear to accurately summarize the general intent of the House.
This is true not only for those favoring "equal," but also for the repre-
sentatives that would have preferred "comparable, ' 46 because, to a
great extent, the debate was merely a "battle of semantics" 47 not a bat-
tle of substance. The desire was to grant the Labor Department suffi-
cient power to realize the limited goal of the EPA while precluding
from the Labor Department the opportunity to run roughshod over
businesses.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the Congressional consider-
ations on the Equal Pay Act culminated in a clear rejection of the com-
parable worth notion. Although some commentators might argue that
Congress rejected the term comparable without necessarily rejecting
the idea of comparable worth, this proposition is contrary to the inten-
tions expressed in the legislative history. The decision was to limit gov-
ernmental intervention to only those situations where a man and
woman were performing substantially equal work.48 While some com-
mentators have suggested that in 1963 Congress lacked a thorough un-
derstanding of sex discrimination,49 the decision to limit the Equal Pay
Act arose, not from Congressional naivet6, but from an unwillingness
to overextend govenmental influence.
B. 7'tle VII
In contrast to all of the care and consideration given by Congress
prior to passage of the Equal Pay Act, there is a striking paucity of
legislative history surrounding the sex-based wage discrimination por-
45. 109 CoNG. REc. 9197 (1963). Goodell's remarks were made May 23, 1963, just eighteen
days before passage of the EPA.
46. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
47. 108 CONG. REc. 14770 (1962).
48. See Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[w]hen Con-
gress enacted the Equal Pay Act, it substituted the word 'equal' for 'comparable' to show that 'the
jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is, they would be very much alike or closely re-
lated to each other,"' Id. at 171 (quoting from Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.
1973)); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970) (quoted in note 40 u pra).
49. See, eg., Beyond EPA, supra note 8, at 765. Commenting on later amendments to title
VII, the authors state, "Congress recognized in 1972 that discrimination is more subtle and com-
plex than had been imagined in 1964. .. ."
[Vol. 17:327
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tion of title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."° Indeed, the very notion
of protecting against sex discrimination via title VII came as an amend-
ment to the Civil Rights Act just days before its passage.5" This cur-
sory-almost careless--treatment of the subject has resulted in a statute
of considerable confusion.
In the course of analyzing title VII's prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion, it is difficult to arrive at a clear understanding of congressional
intent. One problem lies in determining who really wanted the inclu-
sion of "sex" in title VII. Representative Smith proposed the amend-
ment, but it has been persuasively argued that he did so, not out of
concern for sex inequalities, but in an attempt to defeat the Civil Rights
Act.52 Those in Congress speaking in favor of the sex provision actu-
ally opposed title VII's passage, and those persons supporting title VII
spoke out against the amendment.53 For that reason, statements made
by supporters of the provision are due less than the traditional consid-
eration, and it is misleading to speak of their intent.54
50. See 110 CoNG. REc. 2577-85 (1964); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143
(1976) ("[t]he legislative history of Title VI's prohibition of sex discrimination is notable prima-
rily for its brevity").
51. 110 CoNG. REc. 2577 (1964).
52. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under The Civil Rghts Act of 1964, 31 BRooKLYN
L. REv. 62, 78-79 (1964); Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: 7YIe VII of
the 1964 Civil RightsAct andthe Equal PayAct of-1963, 20 HAST. L.J. 305, 310-12 (1968); MILLER,
Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Ai'hts Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. Rnv. 877, 880-85
(1967).
53. See 110 CoNe. Rac. 2804-05 (1964). Note that the "sex amendment" supporters, (Smith
(of Virginia), Dowdy, Tuten, Pool, Andrews (of Alabama), Rivers (of South Carolina), Gary,
Huddleston, Watson, and Gathings), voted against the Civil Rights Act, while those opposing the
sex provision, (Celler, Thompson (of New Jersey), Linsday, Mathias, and Roosevelt), voted/or the
Civil Rights Act. Id. Representative Celler, floor manager of the bill, stated that the sex amend-
ment is "illogical, ill timed, ill placed, and improper." 110 CoNG. REc. 2578 (1964). One com-
mentator has noted.
The very people who most strongly opposed this bill... became the strongest ad-
vocates of the 'sex amendment"... Asif this were not enough of a clue toits mischie-
vous intent, the fact that the sponsor of the amendment was the leader of the civil rights
opposition in the House left no room for doubt. I believed then, and I believe now, that
the "intent" of the sponsor of the bill was to enlist additional opposition to Title VII of
the Civil Rights BilL
Miller, supra note 52, at 883 n.34, (quoting Rep. Green). See Vaas, 2itle VII: Legislative History,
7 B.C. hIwus. & COM. L. RLy. 431, 441-43 (1966); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment:
An Attempt to Interpret Ditle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L. 671, 676-77
(1968).
54. The supporters' statements would not be particularly useful even if they were more credi-
ble. The proposal by Representative Smith was greeted with a great deal of tongue-in-cheek sup-
port such as how every American female has a right to a husband, and that Congress should take
immediate steps to protect this right. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964). But cf. Federal Energy Ad-
ministration v. Algonquin SNG, 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976) ("(a]s a statement by one of the legisla-
tion's sponsors, this explanation deserves to be accorded substantial weight in interpreting the
statute").
9
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The same Congress that passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963 ap-
proved the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 1964 Act was comprehensive
and intended primarily to alleviate racial discrimination, 55 but, as pre-
viously explained, was amended to include sex discrimination. While
the "sex" amendment was apparently not of sufficient concern to delay
passage of the Act, at least two farsighted senators recognized the po-
tential for confusion in reconciling title VII with the EPA. After exten-
sive debate in the Senate, Senator Dirksen expressed his concern that
the sex discrimination amendment to title VII would effectively negate
the carefully designed limitations placed in the EPA:
The sex anti-discrimination provisions of the bill duplicate
the coverage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. But more than
this, they extend far beyond the scope and coverage of the
Equal Pay Act. They do not include the limitations in that
Act with respect to equal work on jobs requiring equal skills
in the same establishments, and thus, cut across different
jobs.56
Speaking as floor manager for the bill, Senator Clark responded to
alleviate the concern:
The Equal Pay Act is a part of the wage hour law, with differ-
ent coverage and with numerous exemptions unlike title VII.
Furthermore, under title VII, jobs can no longer be classified
as to sex, except where there is a rational basis for discrimina-
tion on the ground of bona fide occupational qualification.
The standards in the Equal Pay Act/or determining discrimina-
tion as to wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable
situation under title VI. 57
While this exchange has been interpreted differently by some,58 it
seems to be best read as stating that the EPA's specific standards, rather
than title VII's more general prohibitions, were to control in sex-based
wage discrimination cases. Another commentator has agreed, stating
that, "[w]ith respect to Title VI's proscription of 'discrimination as to
wages,' Congress intended that Title VII not go beyond the limits of the
55. S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., repkintedin [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2355, 2355. "The purpose of [the Civil Rights Act] is to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settle-
ment of the persistent problem of racial and religious discrimination or segregation .... "
56. 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964). Senator Dirksen seems to have been bothered that title VII
might be read as requiring equal pay for wholly different jobs. He wanted to be certain that an
employer could lawfully pay different wages for jobs of different types.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. See, eg., Wage Dircrhmination, supra note 3, at 478 (this passage represents a recognition
of title VI's applicability to situations of "segregated jobs"); BeyondEPA, supra note 8, at 747-48
(this passage emphasizes the difference in scope between title VII and the EPA).
[Vol. 17:327
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The Clark-Dirksen exchange notwithstanding, Senator Bennett
recognized a remaining potential for confusion and, in the interest of
clarifying the title VII/EPA relationship, proposed to amend title
VII.6 Unfortunately, this amendment did nothing more than retain
the already high level of ambiguity, and it was clarified only slightly by
Senator Bennett's equally perplexing statement of purpose:
Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members
of the fair sex in this country, and after careful study by the
appropriate committees of Congress, last year Congress
passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became effective
only yesterday.
By this time, programs have been established for the ef-
fective administration of this Act. Now when the Civil Rights
Bill is under consideration in which the word sex has been
inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention
may have been paid to possible conflicts between the whole-
sale insertion of the word sex in the bill and in the Equal Pay
Act. The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the
event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not
be nullfed.61
The problem with this statement came in discerning which "provisions
of the Equal Pay Act" Bennett had in mind and how they might be
"nullified."
An initial examination of the EPA suggests that the provisions re-
ferred to are the four affirmative defenses of the EPA.62 If these de-
fenses were not available to employers in title VII suits, the EPA's
purpose might indeed be nullified. For instance, if an employer based
his wage scale on seniority, he could defend an EPA suit on that basis.
But if the seniority defense were not available to employers in a title
VII suit, the seniority defense provision in the EPA would be meaning-
less because the employee could simply sue under title VII rather than
the EPA. This interpretation of Bennett's statement of purpose, how-
ever, loses its persuasiveness upon re-examination of section 703(h) of
title VII, of which the Bennett Amendment is a part. In that section the
sentence which immediately precedes the Bennett Amendment already
I
59. Comparable Worth, supra note 3, at 273.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
61. 110 CONG. Rac. 13647 (1964) (emphasis added).
62. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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provides for three of those same affirmative defenses, 63 omitting only
the catch-all provision: "differential based on any other factor other
than sex. .... 64 If Bennett's purpose were merely to emphasize or
clarify these defenses, his amendment lacks much substantive effect
and is largely redundant.
In contrast, the second interpretation of Bennett's statement of
purpose is more consistent with the idea that the Bennett Amendment
was intended to have a substantive effect. This interpretation holds
that one of the "provisions of the Equal Pay Act" that Bennett did not
want to be "nullified" was the EPA's requirement that a plaintiff em-
ployee show "equal work".65 The "equal work" provision would be
nullified if an employee could circumvent that requirement by simply
suing under title VII instead of the EPA.
Representative Celler's interpretation of the Bennett Amendment
was consistent with this second view. During House considerations af-
ter the Senate had approved the bill, Celler stated that the amendment
"provides that compliance with the [EPA] satisfies the requirement of
title [VII] barring discrimination because of sex. .... ,66 This state-
ment suggests that if a wage differential is not prohibited by the EPA, it
is also not prohibited by title VII. The implication here is that since the
EPA does not prohibit any pay differentials unless equal work is
shown, title VII, likewise, does not include such prohibitions. 67
It was not long after enactment of the Civil Rights Act that others
began to notice the conflict between the two interpretations of the Ben-
nett Amendment. In December of 1964 a commentator pointed out the
ambiguity but concluded that "if the Bennett Amendment is to be
given any effect, it must be interpreted to mean that discrimination in
compensation on account of sex does not violate title VII unless it also
violates the Equal Pay Act. ' 68
Prompted by discussions such as these, Senator Bennett sought to
further clarify his amendment of the previous year by entering his own
interpretation into the Congressional Record:
The amendment therefore means that it is not an unlawful
employment practice. .. to have different standards of coin-
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
65. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
66. 110 CoNG. REc. 15896 (1964).
67. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
68. Berg, supra note 52, at 76.
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pensation for nonexempt employees, where such differentia-
tion is not prohibited by the [EPA]. Simply stated, the
[Bennett] amendment means that discrimination in compen-
sation on account of sex does not violate title VII unless it also
violates the Equal Pay Act.69
Of course, a difference in pay between a man and a woman could not
violate the EPA unless the two employees performed equal work.
An additional authoritative interpretation of the Bennett Amend-
ment, wholly consistent with Senator Bennett's 1965 statement, came in
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 1965 sex discrimi-
nation guidelines:
Title VII requires that its provisions be harmonized with the
Equal Pay Act. . . in order to avoid conflicting interpreta-
tions or requirements with respect to situations to which both
statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the Commission inter-
prets Section 703(h) [Bennett Amendment] to mean that the
standards of "equalpayfor equal work" set forth in the Equal
Pay Act/or determining what is unlawful discrimination in com-
pensation are applicable to Title VII.7°
While this contemporaneous statement clearly states that a title VII
claim requires a showing of equal work, it should be noted that the
EEOC altered its position in 1972 by deleting reference to the equal
work provision.7 1 However, notwithstanding this deletion, some courts
have maintained that the earlier version remains authoritative.72
69. 111 CONG. REc. 13359 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Bennett). It must be recognized that so-
called subsequent legislative history is not as credible as prior legislative history. But the Supreme
Court has indicated that it is certainly not without relevance. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,
526-28 (1954) (court relied on a sponsor's statement one year after the bill's passage).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7(a) (1966) (emphasis added).
71. 29 C.R.F. § 1604.8 (1980):
Relationship of title VII to the Equal Pay Act.
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimination based on sex
contained in title VII is coextensive with that of the other prohibitions contained in title
VII and is not limited by section 703(h) to those employees covered by the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
(b) By virtue of section 703(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may be
raised in a proceeding under title VII.
72. See Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 FEP
Cases 450 (D.NJ. 1979):
[I]t is clear to this Court that the earlier [EEOC] guidelines... are entitled to greater
deference than the subsequent guidelines. The fact that the 1965 guidelines were issued
contemporaneously with Title VII while the intent of the Congress which had created the
Commission was clearly impressed upon the minds of the commissioners... coupled
with the fact that the 1965 guidelines expressly addressed the incorporation of the "equal
work" formula, while the 1972 guideline seems to avoid the issue. . . leads this Court to
conclude that the 1965 guideline more nearly reflects the intent of Congress in enacting
the limitation set out in section 703(h).
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The Clark-Dirksen exchange, Bennett's statement of purpose, Cel-
ler's interpretation, Bennett's subsequent explanation, and the EEOC's
report all seemed to be consistent with the notion that Congress did not
intend title VII to provide a wage discrimination remedy unless the
plaintiff could demonstrate that le had performed work equal to that
of an employee of the opposite sex. Until Gunther the courts have
agreed.
III. CASE LAW PRIOR TO GUNTHER
Title VII cases decided before Gunther were quite consistent in
their view that the Bennett Amendment served to incorporate the
EPA's equal work standard.73 The equal work issue was confronted
directly by several courts,74 while others simply implied their recogni-
Id. at 456 (citations omitted), rev'd, 631 F.2d 1094 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3121
(1981). Although the district court decision was reversed, the quoted opinion is significant in that
it is in complete agreement with the Gunther dissent. See 101 S. Ct. at 2261-62. Indeed, the whole
of the district court's opinion as well as the Third Circuit's dissenting opinion closely parallel the
Gunther dissenters. The Supreme Court has stated that EEOC opinions are to be accorded "great
deference." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971). Moreover, as to which of two
conflicting EEOC opinions take precedence, the Supreme Court said that less weight should be
given to opinions not issued contemporaneously with the applicable act and to guidelines that
contradict contemporaneously issued guidelines. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-
43 (1976). Furthermore, an EEOC guideline is not entitled to great weight where it varies from
prior EEOC policy and no new legislative history supports the change. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.l 1 (1977).
73. Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 230 (10th Cir. 1980) ("to establish a
case of discrimination under Title VII, one must prove a differential in pay based on sex for
performing 'equal' work"), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce,
568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1978) ('rimafacie case of violation. . . where it is shown that 'the
employer [has paid] workers of one sex more than workers of the opposite sex for equal work' ");
Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 580 (4th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case in that there was "no showing of any salary differential for... positions which
were substantially equal"), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Calage v. Univ. of Tenn., 544 F.2d
297, 300 (6th Cir. 1976) ("salary disparity was... justified by substantially different duties as-
signed to each [employee]"); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 446-47 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (court reviewed district court finding "to determine whether the jobs in question were actu-
ally equal within the contemplation of the Equal Pay Act"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Orr
v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1975) (performance of equal work
must be shown), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th
Cir. 1971) ("a differential in pay based on sex for performing 'equal' work must be proved"). See
Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[wle do not interpret Title VII as requir-
ing an employer to ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work
classifications").
74. Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 230 (10th Cir. 1980) ("to establish a
case of discrimination under Title VII, one must prove a differential in pay based on sex for
performing 'equal' work"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce,
568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 171
(5th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 120
(10th Cir. 1971) (same).
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tion of the requirements.7 s For example, in Orr v. Frank A MacNeill &
Son76 the Fifth Circuit unequivocally stated: 'To establish a case
under Title VII it must be proved that a wage differential was based
upon sex and that there was the performance of equal work for unequal
compensation."7 7 In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines78 it was equally clear
that the court required equal work even though it did not expressly say
so. In Laffey the appeals court undertook to review the district court's
determination that the female plaintiffs had performed equal work.79
If equal work had not been considered to be necessary for title VII
cases, there would have been no reason for the review.
As stated, courts have consistently upheld the requirement that ti-
tle VII claims must include a showing of equal work. Yet, when not
dealing with the issue directly, some courts seemed to indicate that title
VII might somehow be broader and provide remedies beyond those
currently being sought. In LosAngeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart80 Justice Stevens stated: "In forbidding employers to discrim-
inate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes,"'" perhaps implying that title VII was
not restricted to equal work situations. Paradoxically, some courts ex-
pressed this sentiment in conjunction with a proclamation affirming the
equal work requirement.82 For instance, in Lemons v. City & County of
Denver83 the court stated that "we can consider wage discrimination
claims which involve departures from equal pay for equal work." 4
But within the same paragraph the court noted that "to establish a case
of discrimination under Title VII, one must prove a differential in pay
75. Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 580 (4th Cir. 1977) (no prima facie case
without showing that jobs were "substantially equal"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Calage v.
Univ. of Tenm., 544 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1976) (salary disparity 'Justified by substantially differ-
ent duties"); Lafley v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (necessary to
determine whether the jobs were actually equal), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
76. 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975).
77. Id. at 171.
78. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
79. Id. at 446-47.
80. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
81. Id. at 707 n.13 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens belived that the Civil Rights Act, in
general, made it unlawful for an employer to base his personnel policies on sex stereotypes. Id. at
707.
82. Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 888 (1980). See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
83. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
84. Id. at 229 (emphasis in original).
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based on sex for performing 'equal' work."85 Such a seeming contra-
diction might best be explained as an expression of a desire to increase
protection against discrimination while lacking the necessary statutory
tools.
The general rule, then, until Gunther, was that title ViI's Bennett
Amendment required that equal work be shown. While some courts
seemed to be less rigid when dealing with the issue tangentially,8 6 none
were willing to do away with the equal work standard.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Gunther involved women employed as matrons by Washington
County, Oregon, to guard female prisoners and perform certain clerical
duties. These women brought suit claiming that the county employed
male guards to perform nearly the same duties, and that, in violation of
title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the men were paid more than the wo-
men.87 The matrons were neither claiming equal work nor seeking
equal pay. Their contention was simply that their wages had been dis-
criminatorily depressed and that such was a violation of title VIII.
While acknowledging the pay discrepancy, the county defended its pay
scale by referring to the exemptions provided by title VII's Bennett
Amendment. The County argued that the women had not performed
the same work as the men and were, therefore, precluded from a title
VII suit.
The district court agreed with Washington County's interpretation
of the Bennett Amendment, stating that "[t]he Equal Pay Act of 1963
. . . and Title VII are interlocked . . . and the sex discrimination
prohibitions of Title VII must be construed in the same manner as the
Equal Pay Act."88 The court went on to hold that the "[p]laintiffs have
not met their burden of proving that the men's and women's jobs were
substantially equal .... If the jobs are substantially dissimilar, that is
the end of the inquiry."89
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals the matrons con-
tended that the work they performed was substantially equal; and, in
85. Id. at 230.
86. See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text.
87. In February 1973 the women guards were paid between $525 and $668; the men were
paid between $701 and $940. 101 S. Ct. at 2245 n.l.
88. Gunther v. County of Washington, 20 FEP Cases 788, 791 n.7 (D. Or. 1976).
89. Id. at 791.
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the alternative, even if the work was not substantially equal, part of the
pay differential was due to sex discrimination, and for that part they
were entitled to recover.90 The appeals court affirmed the lower court's
decision on the first of these contentions. 91 But the court did not inter-
pret the Bennett Amendment to mean that the absence of equal work
necessarily precludes a title VII claim, and the case was remanded for
consideration of the matrons' second contention.92 This carefully con-
ceived second contention enabled the court to break with prior case law
by not requiring equal work in a title VII, sex-based, wage discrimina-
tion case. Because the women were not demanding equal pay, the
Ninth Circuit was able to hold that they did not have to show equal
work, while still maintaining that demands for equal pay will continue
to require such a showing. 93 The fundamental idea of this contention
was the same as in a claim of "equal pay for equal work," but because
the women were not demanding equal pay, the contention was called
"discriminatory compensation."
B. Issue Before the Supreme Court
Washington County petitioned the United States Supreme Court,
contending that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment was erroneous.94 The appeals court held that the Amend-
ment incorporated into title VII the four Equal Pay Act affirmative de-
fenses, but, unless the plaintiff demanded equal pay, the Bennett
Amendment did not incorporate the equal work standard. Thus, the
issue squarely before the Court was whether the Bennett Amendment
serves to require a showing of equal work in order to state a title VII
claim of sex-based wage discrimination.9" This question had been an-
swered in the affirmative on numerous occasions by lower courts,96 but
never confronted directly by the Supreme Court. Had the Court
agreed with prior case law that the Bennett Amendment does require
that equal work be shown, all comparable worth claims would have
90. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Note, In
Pursuit of Wages Based on Job Vale-Gunther v. County of Washington, 29 DEPAUL L. Rnv.
907 (1980); Comment, The Bennett Amendment-Title V11 and Gender Based Discrimination, 68
GEO. LJ. 1169 (1980); Comment, Civil t'ghts Jelationshop of Y7tle VII and the Equal Pay Act-
New Muscle for the Struggle Against Sex .Dscrimination, 19 WAsHBURN L.J. 554 (1980).
91. 602 F.2d at 888.
92. Id. at 891.
93. Id.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 2247.
95. Id. at 2246.
96. See notes 73-79 supra and accompanying text.
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been precluded, defeating the primary objective of the comparable
worth theory which is to allow claims where it is not possible to demon-
strate equal work.
C. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court in distinguish-
ing between an "equal pay for equal work" claim under title VII
(wherein equal work remains necessary) and a "discriminatory com-
pensation" claim under title VII, wherein equal work need not be
shown. The decision clearly does not endorse the theory of comparable
worth, stating only, "It is sufficient to note that respondents' claims of
discriminatory undercompensation are not barred by [the Bennett
Amendment] merely because respondents do not perform work equal
to that of male jail guards."97 The Court's holding opens up the doors
for a new category of discrimination suits, but provides no guidance on
how these suits are to be pursued.
V. ANALYSIS
To the extent that the Supreme Court has now made it possible to
bring a title VII suit without demonstrating equal work, the Gunther
decision marks a clear departure from prior law and the creation of a
new claim under title VII, "discriminatory undercompensation." The
rationale of the majority is that there is nothing in the Bennett Amend-
ment to preclude this new claim; it has simply gone unnoticed since
title VIrs enactment in 1964.98 The reality of the "discriminatory un-
dercompensation" notion is that its creation was dependent on an inter-
pretation of the Bennett Amendment that had been consistently
rejected since the amendment was added to title VII in 1964.99 The
majority has resurrected this interpretation, thereby encouraging law-
suits in an area that was not intended to be covered by title VII. The
extensive debates over whether to use "equal" or "comparable" serve
to illustrate the deep concern that Congress had in the early 1960's that
a limit be maintained on the government's interference with businesses'
wage setting practices. The majority in Gunther has now cast that deep
concern aside.
The Court's departure from case law notwithstanding, the decision
97. 101 S. Ct. at 2254.
98. But see notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 69-79 supra and accompanying text.
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cannot be said to be incorrect. Although Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
arguments are at least equally persuasive, the majority's decision is
neither illogical nor unreasonable. Yet, the decision is unfortunate be-
cause it avoids the ultimate issue of Title VII's applicability. The elimi-
nation of the equal work standard opens up a new category of lawsuits,
but it is unlikely that any of these lawsuits will result in recovery.' 00
The removal of the equal work standard in title VII suits is analogous
to the taking down of a fence so that the plaintiff may run into a brick
wall. Moreover, when coupled with this reality, the majority's opinion
may serve to actually delay achievement of the goal toward which it
purportedly strives-more equitable pay for women.
The Supreme Court in Gunther was faced with a dilemma. Title
VII was found to be hopelessly ambiguous, and its equally ambiguous
legislative history was in such short supply that it proved to be of little
interpretative value. A common sense approach to this problem was to
rely in large part on the legislative history of the EPA, since it more
carefully dealt with the problem of sex based wage discrimination and
was passed by the very same Congress one year earlier. Indeed, at least
one court was explicit in its reliance on the earlier bill's history,' 10 and
the EPA debate concerning the use of "equal" rather than "compara-
ble" was undoubtedly of some influence. The legislative history dem-
onstrates that during the early 1960's the focus was on providing relief
to women who were doing the same work as men but were not receiv-
ing the same pay. This was understood to be a limited objective and
was not meant to provide a remedy for each of the multitudinous ineq-
uities of the labor market. The plaintiff nurses in Lemons v. City &
County of Denver, °2 for example, contended that their rate of pay was
inequitable because nurses have historically been underpaid. Many
might agree with such a statement, but such an exceedingly compli-
cated claim was simply not within the contemplation of Congress when
it enacted title VII.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Gunther implicitly echoes the notion
that reliance on the EPA's legislative history is warranted in title VII
cases. He stresses:
It defies common sense to believe that the same Congress-
100. See notes 105-112 infra and accompanying text.
101. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 17 FEP
Cases 16, 21 (N.D.W. Va. 1977) ("[w]ith the lack of legislative history regarding the Bennett
amendment, it is useful to explore the background and purpose of the Equal Pay Act").
102. 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
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which after 18 months of hearings and debates, had decided
in 1963 upon the extent of federal involvement it desired in
the area of wage rate claims-intended sub silentio to reject all
of this work and to abandon the limitations of the equal work
approach just one year later, when it enacted Title VII.10 3
Whether or not this belief "defies common sense," as Rehnquist
stated, it was a belief adopted by the majority. Without accusing the
majority of lacking in common sense, the different results can best be
explained as arising from different opinions on the relevance of legisla-
tive history and other related materials. Where the dissent was willing
to examine comments and interpretations made by several interested
parties, the majority carefully limited its scope of review to the statu-
tory language and a few selected bits of legislative history.'0 4 The ma-
jority's error, then, is not one of misinterpretation but of unreasonably
restricting its scope of review. While material beyond the statutory lan-
guage can rarely be said to be controlling in the course of statutory
interpretation, the high level of title VII's ambiguity should surely have
obliged the Court to use any relevant material that was available.
The unfortunate effect of Gunther is that is gives the false impres-
sion of breaking the last bastion of sex-based wage discrimination. At
long last, women in traditionally female jobs will not be denied a tide
VII claim because of their inability to point to a higher paid male coun-
terpart. But to their consternation, these women will continue to be
denied relief because title VII in no way provides for an alternative
means of proving sex discrimination. The Court surely realized this
problem but refused to state any guidelines for its resolution: "We do
not decide in this case the precise contours of lawsuits challenging sex
discrimination in compensation under title VI."'0°
Indeed, there exists an inextricable problem of proof in demon-
strating discrimination without using a comparison. If "discrimina-
tion" is to be defined as "different treatment," the question then
becomes, "different from what?" Without the existence of an equal job
being performed by a man, a woman will find it exceptionally difficult
103. 101 S. Ct. at 2257 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2249 n.12 ("memorandum obviously has no bearing on the meaning of... the
Bennett Amendment"); Id. 2251 n.16 ("hesitant to attach much weight to comments made after
the passage of legislation.... we give them no weight at all"); Id. at 2251 ("[w]e can only con-
clude that Representative Celler's explanation was not intended to be precise, and does not pro-
vide a solution to the present problem.... The interpretations of the Bennett Amendment by
[the EEOC] do not provide much guidance in this case").
105. Id. at 2254.
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to show that she has been treated differently because of her sex. She
may be able to prove that her employer pays men more than women,
but the numerous legitimate factors for determining wages offer an em-
ployer an almost infinite number of ways to explain the wage differen-
tial. As a result, although the technical requirement of equal work is
now gone, a practical requirement of equal work remains.
In a very few cases-and Gunther may be one of these few-it may
seem possible to demonstrate discrimination despite the absence of
equal work. Gunther was unusual in that Washington County all but
admitted the claimed discrimination. Although the county conducted
its own study to determine the worth of both the matrons' and the male
guards' jobs, it paid the matrons somewhat less than the determined
amount, while paying the men their full estimated value.106 Even given
this finding, the wage differential may still be legitimately explained as
being within the realities of the labor market. For example, one need
not be an economist to recognize that a large supply of available labor,
in this case female prison guards, brings down the price of that labor to
beneath that which it might otherwise be "worth." Duly supported de-
fenses such as this would be difficult for the matrons to refute. For
example, the court in Christensen v. Iowa'17 refused to grant recovery
by saying, "We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to
ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work
classifications." 108 The decision to intervene in the process of wage de-
termination implies wide-ranging economic effects, l09 and the courts
have expressed great reluctance to become so involved. 10 The notion
of setting wages according to what some non-employer believes certain
jobs to be "worth" is a fundamental violation of the precepts on which
the free market economy is based.
The labor market defense is but one of the many legitimate factors
for determining wages, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving that
none of them were used.' While the situation in Gunther was unique
106. Id. at 2246.
107. 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977).
108. Id.
109. Comparable Worth, .spra note 3 at 289-94; Wall St. J., Sep. 15, 1981, at 22, coL 1 (adop-
tion of comparable worth policies estimated to cost around $2 billion).
110. See Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 17 FEP Cases 906, 907 (1978), a~fd, 620 F.2d
228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980) (comparable worth "is pregnant with the
possibility of disrupting the entire economic system of the United States of America"); Christen-
sen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[wle do not interpret Title VII as requiring an
employer to ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications").
111. 563 F.2d at 355.
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in that it appeared to offer a means of proving discrimination by refer-
ence to the County's own study, the vast majority of the cases will not
provide such evidence. Absent a talkative employer who blatantly
boasts of his intentional discriminatory practices, there will seemingly
be no way for a court to discern whether a wage differential is due to
sex discrimination or some other legitimate factor.' 1 2
While the foregoing discussion illustrates the failures of Gunther,
of even greater chagrin to those seeking sexual equality is the decision's
longer range effect. By giving the appearance of moving towards
acceptance of the comparable worth theory, the Court serves only to
delay arrival at a real solution to sex-based wage discrimination. Ulti-
mately, title VII will fail in its assumed role as the vehicle with which to
end all wage inequalities, and until this fact is realized, no legitimate
progress can be made.
The most productive way the Supreme Court could have handled
Gunther would have been to declare that, as written, title VII cannot
provide relief for sex-based wage discrimination unless the plaintiff first
demonstrates equal work." 3 Such a decision would have forced the
realization that the assumed inequities cannot be remedied via title VII.
Once that realization is reached, the issue can receive attention in the
proper forum, Congress, in which the necessary policy decisions can be
legitimately made. The Court does not do justice to either proponents
or opponents of comparable worth by encouraging the continued
search for loopholes through strained interpretations of title VII and
the EPA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, Gunther clearly does not represent real move-
ment towards comparable worth because title VII simply cannot sup-
112. See Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631
F.2d 1094, 1108-1110 (3rd Cir. 1980) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3121 (1981). The
dissent in this case found that use of the comparable worth theory would be the only way for a
plaintiff to prove discriminatory compensation (an issue that the Gunther decision expressly
avoids, note 105, supra, and accompanying text) and that this manner of proof is prohibited vis a
vis the Bennett Amendment. This reasoning exemplifies the crux of the objection to allowing title
VII claims without a showing of equal work. The dissenters in Gunther and 1UE . Westinghouse
took account of Congress's clear rejection of comparable worth and reasonably inferred that by
precluding the only manner ofproving "discriminatory compensation," it obviously also intended
to preclude the cause of action. It would be absurd to conclude that Congress conceived of a
remedial law for which it concomitantly denied a means to recover.
113. Note that this position is not inconsistent with a desire to alleviate sex based employment
inequalities. It merely recognizes the limited utility of title VII. See 631 F.2d at 1115 n.17.
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port such movement. This fact was noted by Justice Rehnquist as the
case's "saving feature."' 1 4 Yet, in the short run, the proponents of com-
parable worth will no doubt view the Gunther decision as a step to-
wards achievement of equal pay for women. By removing the equal
work requirement it allows many women in traditionally female jobs
such as nurses and secretaries to sue their employer under title VII,
claiming discriminatory compensation. But the right to sue is not the
right to recover; and, because of the problem of proof, it is doubtful
that Gunther will affect the number of title VII recoveries. The gains to
women are, therefore, illusory.
The decision was not technically incorrect, as it was based simply
on one of two plausible interpretations. However, the dissent made
valid use of legislative history and arrived at a more reasonable and
certainly more realistic conclusion. While the scope of title VII was
intended to be broader than the EPA, it clearly does not provide reme-
dies for all forms of sex-based wage discrimination. Its focus was lim-
ited to situations in which men and women are performing the same
work. Although Gunther purports to widen that focus, in all practical-
ity the equal work standard will remain, as will the frustrations of un-
derpaid women.' 15
Gregory Noble Fiske
114. 101 S. CL at 2265 (Rehnquist, ., dissenting).
115. Despite its infirmities, Gunther has not been ignored by the business community. The
consulting firm of Hewitt Associates found that 180 of 537 companies surveyed since Gunther were
at least considering pay-policy changes. Wall St. ., Nov. 10, 1981, at 1, col 5.
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